Expert Testimony on the Law: Excludable or Justifiable? by Friedland, Steven I.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 37 
Number 3 
Volume 37, Issues 3,4,5 (May - September 
1983) 
In Honor of Dean Soia Mentschikoff 
Article 8 
9-1-1983 
Expert Testimony on the Law: Excludable or Justifiable? 
Steven I. Friedland 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Steven I. Friedland, Expert Testimony on the Law: Excludable or Justifiable?, 37 U. Miami L. Rev. 451 
(1983) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol37/iss3/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 




Expert testimony on domestic law' currently occupies an
unenviable position in the federal' trial system. The Federal Rules
of Evidences do not recognize it. The Federal Rules of Civil4 and
Criminal5 Procedure do not specifically permit, much less en-
courage, its use. Neither the judiciary nor legal scholars have
shown much interest in the subject.' A party seldom offers expert
legal testimony, and when he does, the judge often excludes it.7
* Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Columbia; B.A., State University
of New York at Binghamton; J.D., Harvard Law School; Instructor, University of Miami
School of Law, 1982-83.
1. For purposes of this article, domestic law includes federal law and the laws of all the
states.
2. This article examines the use of expert testimony on the law only in federal courts,
but the principles discussed are equally applicable to state courts.
3. 28 U.S.C. app. § 2076 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The Federal Rules of Evidence govern
the admission of evidence at trial in federal courts.
4. Id. § 2072.
5. 18 id. app. § 3001.
6. Reported cases rarely mention testimony on the law or its application. Sharp v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Pa. 1978), discussing the testimony of Professor
Bernard Wolfman, is an exception. Professor Wolfman, a tax specialist at Harvard Law
School, has testified in more than six cases, but this is the only case that mentions his
testimony. Courts have either considered the testimony on the law to be inconsequential or
the opinions have not been published. See Wallin v. Lanz, No. 79-1627 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
Two law review casenotes and one law review comment have discussed expert testimony
on the law. Comment, Criminal Liability for Willful Evasion of an Uncertain Tax, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 1348 (1981); Note, United States v. Garber: The Propriety of Expert Legal
Testimony, 26 ST. Louis U.L.J. 447 (1982); Case Note, The State of the Law as Evidence
for the Jury: United States v. Garber, 46 Mo. L. Rav. 255 (1981).
7. See, e.g., Marx & Co. v. Diners' Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 510 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 861 (1977) (reversible error to admit expert testimony on the legal significance of
various facts addressed at trial); Cooley v. United States, 501 F.2d 1249, 1253 (9th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1123 (1975) (proffered evidence consisting of written legal opin-
ions properly excluded); Richard T. Green Co. v. City of Chelsea, 149 F.2d 927, 930 n.5 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 741 (1945) (district court properly excluded the testimony of the
tax assessor on the question of whether property was real or personal); Lisansky v. United
States, 31 F.2d 846, 851 (4th Cir. 1929) (proper to exclude expert opinions of accountants
that profit did not have to be reported until received); Allen v. Union R.R., 162 F. Supp.
635, 637 (W.D. Pa. 1958) (Interstate Commerce Commission inspector's interpretation of a
safety regulation properly excluded).
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Expert testimony on the law generally lacks recognition as a trial
resource.e
Despite its disfavored status, expert legal testimony has occa-
sionally been permitted at trial to assist the judges or the jury.10
This article explores the propriety of expert testimony on domestic
law in both contexts-to assist the court in determining questions
of law, and to aid the jury1" in deciding matters of fact.
12
This article concludes that the prevailing attitude against the
use of all expert legal testimony is inappropriate. Instead, such tes-
timony should be considered on a case-by-case basis. While valid
historical reasons may once have existed for completely excluding
expert legal testimony," the current predisposition against even
limited usage disregards the utility of the testimony to judge and
jury. 14
The first part of this article defines expert legal testimony and
explains why it has traditionally been excluded. The second part
presents the argument for selective use of expert legal testimony.
The next section describes the cases in which expert legal testi-
mony has been permitted at trial. The final section provides a brief
assessment of the merits of such legal testimony.
S. At one time, however, the English court system permitted testimony on the law; the
testimony in medieval English trials consisted solely of legal conclusions. Farley, Instruc-
tions to Juries-Their Role in the Judicial Process, 42 YALE L.J. 194, 196 (1932).
9. See, e.g., Ohio v. Collins (In re Madeline Marie Nursing Homes), 694 F.2d 433, 455
(6th Cir. 1982) (district court should have availed itself of expert testimony on Ohio Medi-
caid regulations).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1979); Laverne v. Corning,
376 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Contra United States v. Herzog, 632 F.2d 469 (5th Cir.
1980).
11. For purposes of this article, the fact finder will always be a jury. Many of the
problems discussed here will not arise if the judge determines both law and fact. Adherence
to the evidentiary rules is less strict in nonjury trials. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 60, at 137 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972); G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 3, at 3 n.4 (1978).
12. Expert testimony could also be used to assist the judge in clarifying the law for the
jury. This article will not address that use.
13. There existed an historical presumption of judicial expertise, which permitted the
judge to take judicial notice of domestic law. The judge often determines the applicable law
without any requirement of formal pleading or proof and is free to choose the sources of
information upon which he intends to rely. C. McCoRMICK, supra note 11, § 335, at 776.
14. Id. Courts formerly refused to permit expert testimony on foreign law. Foreign law
was a question of fact to be proved and pleaded to the jury until the enactment of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.1 in 1966. See
generally Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and the "Fact" Approach to Determining Foreign Law:
Death Knell for a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 613, 617 (1967).
[Vol. 37:451
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II. DEFINING EXPERT LEGAL TESTIMONY
Expert testimony on the law consists of an opinion on the
state of domestic law, which includes federal law, the law of the
jurisdiction in which the court sits, and the law of sister jurisdic-
tions. The testimony may bear on the relative certainty or uncer-
tainty of the law, what the law is, what it means, or a combination
of these.
Expert legal testimony is given by a witness in open court1' in
much the same way as factual testimony. The expert is subject to
cross-examination" and to questions from the judge.1 7 When ex-
pert testimony on the law is used to assist the jury in determining
a question of fact, 8 the usual evidentiary requirements apply. The
testimony must be relevant-tending to make a fact in issue more
or less probable'9-and may not be unfairly prejudicial, confusing,
or the cause of undue delay. 0 Special evidentiary limitations on
expert witnesses require that the expert be qualified and that his
testimony assist the jury in determining a fact in issue or in under-
standing the evidence. 1 In contrast, expert legal testimony offered
to assist the judge is not considered evidence and is not subject to
any guidelines except those imposed by the court.
III. THE TRADITIONAL RATIONALE FOR EXCLUDING EXPERT LEGAL
TESTIMONY
The traditional rationale for excluding expert testimony on
domestic law is that it is unnecessary, both practically and concep-
tually. As a conceptual matter, the judge is charged with full re-
sponsibility for knowing the domestic law and resolving any ques-
tions about it. On a practical level, if the judge requires assistance
in determining the law, sources superior to legal testimony alleg-
edly exist.
At trial, responsibilities are allocated between judge and jury 2so that issues of law are reserved for the court and questions of
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 43.
16. FED. R. EvID. 611.
17. Id. 614(b).




22. See 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2549, at 499-500 (3d ed.
1940).
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fact for the jury.2 8 Within the present trial system, it is almost axi-
omatic that the judge is the sole arbiter and dispenser of the law at
trial.24 The judge decides the content of the law28 and instructs the
members of the jury on the applicability of the law to the facts of
the case.26
The judge is responsible for deciding questions of law because
of the presumed legal expertise he has achieved through training
and experience. 27 This presumption of expertise is the primary rea-
son that expert legal testimony has been deemed unnecessary. Pro-
fessor Wigmore has written:
The general principle ... is ... that the tribunal does not need
the witness' judgment and hence will insist on dispensing with
it. But here it is not that the jury can of themselves determine
equally well; it is that the judge (or the jury as instructed by the
judge) can determine equally well .... It is not the common
knowledge of the jury which renders the witness' opinion unnec-
essary, but the special legal knowledge of the judge."'
If the judge lacks sufficient expertise in a particular area of the
law, the system affords well-accepted means of assistance. The
judge may undertake independent investigation on his own or may
direct law clerks29 to do the research. The judge may also request
briefs from counsel or hear oral argument.3 0 Given the presumed
23. Even the great English jurist, Lord Coke, adopted this definition of the roles of
judge and jury at trial. See Dowman's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 743 (K.B. 1585).
[Tlhis they may do by the common law, which has ordained, that matters in fact
shall be tried by jurors, and matters in law by the Judges: . . . the saying of the
law, and the wisdom of the law was to refer things to persons in which they had
knowledge, and were expert, according to the ancient rule . . . ; and therefore
the law will not compel . . . the jurors, who have not knowledge in the law, to
take upon them the knowledge of points in law . . . , but leave them to the
consideration of the Judges.
Id. at 750.
24. J. WIGMORE, supra note 22.
25. C. McCoRMICK, supra note 11, § 335, at 776.
26. The judge informs the jury through sets of instructions at the close of each case and
may request that counsel propose instructions to be given to the jury. Id. § 345, at 824. The
judge also determines the admissibility of evidence, FED. R. EvID. 104, and matters of proce-
dure such as the correctness of service of process and jurisdiction.
27. 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 1952, at 103. Permitting only the judge to rule on
questions of law enhances "precision in the statement of the rule." See 1 W. HOLDSWORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 168 (1956).
28. 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 1952, at 103 (footnote omitted).
29. Each federal district court judge employs two full-time law clerks. The judge may
apply for a third clerk to deal with a large case or other pressing matter.
30. In determining the content or applicability of a rule of domestic law, the
judge is unrestricted in his investigation and conclusion. He may reject the pro-
[Vol. 37:451
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expertise of the judge and the sources at his disposal, expert legal
testimony to the court appears to invade the province of the judge
and either to convey information that the court already possesses
or to convey data that the court could easily obtain.
Expert legal testimony to the jury appears to have similar de-
ficiencies. If the testimony were presented to the jury, it would ar-
guably usurp the judge's role as sole dispenser of the law, im-
pugning judicial integrity in the process. Moreover, the substance
of the testimony may simply repeat what the judge already has
stated or may otherwise confuse the jury with inconsistencies.3 '
IV. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR ALLOWING EXPERT LEGAL TESTIMONY
The traditional rationale, described above, for excluding ex-
pert testimony on domestic law is not entirely persuasive today.
Specific situations exist where the benefits of expert legal testi-
mony outweigh its costs. In these situations, both the underlying
objectives of the trial system and the procedural rules that shape
the system support the utilization of the testimony.
3 2
A. The Usefulness of Expert Legal Testimony and the
Objectives of the Trial System
The objectives of the trial system, as reflected in its rules of
procedure and evidence, provide the criteria for the admission of
evidence at trial and are, a fortiori, the standard by which expert
legal testimony should be measured. Two central objectives of the
trial system are fairness and efficiency. Each plays a special role.
Fairness promotes public confidence in the system. It encompasses
notions of uniformity, regularity, predictability, and the opportu-
nity to be heard. Efficiency, on the other hand, focuses on the
operability of the system. Procedural rules, which ensure that the
system is administrable as well as fair, increase the efficiency of the
system.
positions of either party or of both parties. He may consult the sources of perti-
nent data to which they refer, or he may refuse to do so. He may make an inde-
pendent search for persuasive data or rest content with what he has or what the
parties present. . . . [T]he parties do no more than to assist; they control no
part of the process.
FED. R. EvID. 201 advisory committee note (quoting Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARv. L.
REv. 269, 270-71 (1944)).
31. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, testimony that is confusing should be ex-
cluded. FED. R. EvID. 403.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 66-69.
1983]
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Efficiency dictates that the evidence admitted at trial for the
jury's consideration must be both useful and cost effective. Fair-
ness demands that the evidence not be fairly prejudicial. The Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence expressly reflect these tenets.33 Notions of
efficiency and fairness also suggest that the judge, in determining
the applicable law, should consult only those sources that would
assist him and that have some indicia of reliability, such as recog-
nized authorities. If expert testimony on the law to judge or jury
can be justified on grounds of efficiency and fairness, the testimony
is appropriate.
B. Usefulness to the Judge
In cases involving obscure issues of domestic law, 4 the judge
may lack the resources required to make an informed determina-
tion of those issues. For example, applicable precedent or other
written authorities may not be readily accessible in published
form. In these situations, the court must resort to alternative
sources to determine the law. One very useful source may be ex-
pert legal testimony.
An instructive parallel is the treatment of foreign law ques-
tions at trial. Historically, the inaccessibility of reliable sources led
to the use of expert legal testimony in determining questions of
foreign law.3 5 Foreign law questions, often not capable of ready and
accurate determination by the court,6 were generally treated as
questions of fact, subject to formal pleading and proof.37 Expert
33. FED. R. EVID. 402, 403.
34. See Ohio v. Collins (In re Madeline Marie Nursing Homes), 694 F.2d 433, 445 (6th
Cir. 1982) (involving Ohio Medicaid regulations).
35. See Miller, supra note 14, at 617; see also Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v. Robert
Stewart & Sons, 336 U.S. 386, 397 (1949); Philp v. Macri, 261 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1958);
Dulles v. Katamoto, 256 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1958); United States ex rel. Zdunic v. Uhl, 137
F.2d 858, 861 (2d Cir. 1943); Tsangaraskis v. Panama S.S. Co., 197 F. Supp. 704 (E.D. Pa.
1961); J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 621.2 (1935).
American courts for many years treated the law of sister states as foreign law to be
pleaded and proved. Note, Judicial Notice of Foreign Law, 18 VAND. L. REv. 1962, 1974
(1965).
36. See Miller, supra note 14, at 619. The judge was not presumed to know the law
outside of his own jurisdiction. Note, supra note 35, at 1974.
37. The treatment of a foreign law question depended upon whether the law was writ-
ten or unwritten. Note, supra note 35, at 1974.
Foreign law questions received disparate treatment. For example, while it was accepted
in English courts that foreign law would not be treated the same as English law, it was
unclear exactly what proof was required, how such proof should be offered, and who should
decide the issue. Id. at 1973. American courts also permitted various forms of proof. See
Miller, supra note 14, at 620-24; see also Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189
[Vol. 37:451
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testimony became the widely accepted means for proving issues of
foreign law."e
In 1966, with the adoption of Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and Rule 26.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, foreign law issues finally received uniform treatment as
questions of law for the court rather than as questions of fact.'
The new rules alleviated the difficulties that had existed in proving
foreign law. These rules, which are essentially identical, expressly
reaffirmed the court's freedom to consider multiple sources, includ-
ing expert testimony, in determining foreign law questions: "The
court, in determining foreign law, may consider any relevant mate-
rial or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a
party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. ' '40
Obscure questions of domestic law are analagous to questions
of foreign law in that both may present problems of unreliable and
inaccessible source material. When clear interpretation of the law
is not available, both fairness and efficiency dictate that the most
reliable source of information should be considered. In matters of
obscure domestic law, as in matters of foreign law, expert legal tes-
timony will often be the most reliable source of information availa-
ble to the court.
A legal expert may also assist the court in cases involving com-
plex questions of law by enhancing the judge's understanding of
the meaning of a particular law. This may occur, for example, in a
complicated business or antitrust matter brought before a judge
who seldom hears these types of cases.
The complexity and obscurity of legal questions has increased
dramatically in recent years, further justifying the use of expert
legal testimony. Prior to the modern technological revolution, it
was easier for judges to be "experts" on the law. Laws were not as
numerous 41 and were often less complex. Judicial calendars were
(2d Cir. 1955); FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1 advisory committee note.
38. Note, supra note 35, at 1977; Miller, supra note 14, at 622.
39. "Rule 44.1 is added by amendment to furnish Federal Courts with a uniform and
effective procedure for raising and determining an issue concerning the law of a foreign
country." FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1 advisory committee note. "Rule 26.1 is substantially the same
as Civil Rule 44.1." FED. R. CanM. P. 26.1 advisory committee note.
One commentator has noted: "One of the objectives of Rule 44.1 is to abandon the fact
characterization of foreign law and to make the process of determining alien law identic
with the method of ascertaining domestic law to the extent that it is possible." Miller, supra
note 14, at 657.
40. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.1 (emphasis added). The Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is
identical, except that it reads "admissible under Rule 43." FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1.
41. The second session of the 97th Congress passed more than 400 amendments to ex-
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not as severely backlogged.4' There were not as many multi-party,
multi-district, or multi-month trials. In the past few decades, tech-
nological advances have had a significant effect on the law. Break-
throughs such as those that occurred in the computer industry
have stimulated entirely new areas of scientific proof." The
proliferation of big business has led to exceedingly complex take-
over fights and mammoth corporate mergers." The tax laws have
undergone such exponential growth that interpretation of the In-
ternal Revenue Code is now beyond the comprehension of all but
tax specialists.4" Precedent, in the form of published legal opinions,
has proliferated.4" The law now includes areas of such depth and
difficulty that specialization is almost a necessity to comprehend a
single field of law. For these reasons, a judge may need and benefit
from the assistance of legal experts.47
Yet, if expert testimony is to be truly efficient, it must be su-
perior, at least in some respects, to other forms of assistance such
as independent research or memoranda of law." Expert testimony
isting laws and enacted more than 40 new federal statutes. 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM.
Naws Table 10, 161-70.
42. Some cases have taken as long as ten years to resolve. See, e.g., NAACP v. Clai-
borne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (The complaint was filed in a Mississippi state
court on October 31, 1969. The United States Supreme Court decided the case on July 2,
1982.).
43. Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REv. 414, 417 (1952).
44. See generally Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
45. In response to taxpayers' questions, the Internal Revenue Service issued more than
50,000 letter rulings in 1982. Private Letter Rulings 8201001-8252166, I.R.S. LEmrER RuL.
REP. (CCH) (Jan. 1982-Jan. 1983).
46. Between 1920 and 1980 the Federal Reporter publislied 191 volumes; 143 of those
volumes contain cases decided between 1960 and 1970.
47. The practice of courts in fifteenth and sixteenth century England may provide an
instructive parallel. There, while testimony by witnesses was largely disfavored due to a fear
of perjury, Rosenthal, The Development of the Use of Expert Testimony, 2 LAW & CoN-
TEMP. PROBS. 403 (1935), witnesses were still summoned on occasion as "expert assistants to
the court," 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 212, to aid the judge on various subjects
requiring special knowledge. See, for example, Buckley v. Thomas, 75 Eng. Rep. 192 (C.P.
1554) (Saunders, J.):
[I]n 7 H. 6. [about 1429] in a case that came before the Judges, which was deter-
minable in our law, and also touched upon the civil law, they were well content
to hear Huls, who was a batchelor of both laws, argue and discourse upon logic,
and upon the difference between compulsione praecisa et causativa, as men that
were not above being instructed and made wiser by him.
Id.
48. Regarding the pecuniary cost of an expert witness on the law, the expert witness fee
would probably be no greater than the fees of other experts. The cost may even be less than
that for preparing briefs or oral arguments.
It would be inefficient for a judge to permit expert testimony on the law when he is
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does have several advantages. A significant advantage is that the
legal testimony is offered in the same manner as factual testimony.
The judge may ask questions and assess the witness's demeanor,
and the parties may cross-examine the witness. Legal testimony
may thus prove to be more accurate and responsive than other
sources such as arguments of counsel or submitted memoranda.4 9
In addition, other sources may not match the expertise of a
witness.
C. Usefulness to the Jury
When the state of the law is pertinent to deciding a fact in
issue, expert legal testimony may assist jurors in determining that
fact. For example, a jury charged with deciding whether a person
intentionally violated a tax law may find the law-and what con-
stitutes a reasonable, good faith interpretation of the law-beyond
the realm of common understanding. While it remains the proper
function of the judge to instruct the jury on the law, expert testi-
mony on the reasonableness of the defendant's interpretation of
the law can help the jury to assess the merits of a good faith de-
fense and can provide a frame of reference for the jury's decision.50
Testimony on the relative uncertainty of a law may also be useful
to a jury. Where the willfulness of a party's conduct is at issue, and
the party allegedly relied on the law, logic suggests that the more
uncertain the law, the more likely it will be that the party acted in
good faith. A witness, however, may not merely assert that the law
is so vague that an individual could not have the requisite intent to
violate it. If that were the case, the law would be constitutionally
void for vagueness. Instead, the testimony should focus on whether
the law, though satisfying a challenge on void-for-vagueness
grounds, contains ambiguities or uncertainties that would support
the defendant's position.' 1 The testimony would therefore bear on
the credibility of the defense presented and would be relevant to
the factual issue of intent.
certain of the law. Allowing the testimony in such a case would simply be a waste of time.
Similarly, the introduction of unlimited conflicting opinions will be inefficient.
49. It is reasonable to believe that someone who has written a treatise in the field or
has taught the subject for many years is better able to effectively convey the subtleties of
the law than are the most competent practicing attorneys.
50. See United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 99 (5th Cir. 1979). Contra Comment,
Criminal Liability for Willful Evasion of an Uncertain Tax, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1348, 1355
n.52 (1981).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 99 (5th Cir. 1979).
1983]
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The value of testimony to the jury concerning a law's uncer-
tainty or the reasonableness of different interpretations of the law
depends on several factors. One factor is whether the defendant
relied on the law. 52 If the defendant did not rely on the law, testi-
mony on reasonable interpretations of the law would probably be
irrelevant. Another factor is the type of case in which the testi-
mony is offered. The testimony's value may be enhanced, for ex-
ample, if it is offered by the defense in a criminal matter. In this
situation the defendant has much at stake, and the testimony may
be important to the defendant's theory of the case.
Regardless of its relevance, expert legal testimony to the jury
may be prejudicial and subject to exclusion. For example, if a pre-
eminent legal expert testifies, the aura of expertise may be difficult
to overcome.53 Experts with impressive credentials from all walks
of life, however, are routinely permitted to testify before juries,
and there appears to be no evidence that legal experts would influ-
ence juries any more than experts in other fields do. The potential
for prejudice resulting from expert testimony, moreover, is mini-
mized by the availability of cross-examination and jury instruc-
tions when appropriate. 4
Additionally, it may be claimed that an expert's testimony on
the uncertainty or vagueness of a law-presented to show that the
defendant cannot be guilty of a willful violation-may confuse the
jurors, who will later be instructed on the law by the court.55 Al-
though the danger of a jury misinterpreting the role of such testi-
mony is real, it can be lessened considerably through careful expla-
nation and instruction from the bench.
D. The Effect of Expert Legal Testimony on the Trial System
Expert legal testimony appears to be fair and efficient in terms
of its assistance to the judge and jury. It remains inappropriate,
52. See, e.g., United States v. Clardy, 612 F.2d 1139, 1153 (9th Cir. 1980).
53. See United States v. Collins, 395 F. Supp. 629 (M.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 523 F.2d 1051
(3d Cir. 1975). "[T]here was a substantial risk that the credentials and persuasive powers of
the expert would have had a greater influence on the jury than the evidence presented at
trial, thereby interfering with the jury's special role as fact finder." 395 F. Supp. at 637.
54. See Case Note, The State of the Law as Evidence for the Jury: United States v.
Garber, 46 Mo. L. REV. 255, 264 (1981).
55. Cf. Cooley v. United States, 501 F.2d 1249, 1253-54 (9th Cir. 1974):
It is the function of the jury to determine the facts from the evidence and apply
the law as given by the court to the facts as found by them from the evidence.
Obviously, it would be most confusing to a jury to have legal material introduced
as evidence and then argued as to what the law is or ought to be.
[Vol. 37:451
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however, if it excessively disrupts the orderly functioning of the
judicial system. That functioning relies on the predictable and well
established allocation of responsibilities between judge and jury.56
Hence, if expert legal testimony interferes with this allocation, it
would not be warranted.
The central problem posed by expert legal testimony on the
systemic level arises from the "law" label affixed to the testi-
mony.5 7 Under the present trial structure, this label almost auto-
matically signifies that the subject matter is within the domain of
the judge and is not properly offered as testimony or as evidence,
both of which are traditionally reserved for "factual matters." It
would be erroneous, however, to permit the law label to fully deter-
mine the treatment of an issue at trial.58 An improper label can
56. The separate functions of judge and jury gained acceptance as early as the sixteenth
century. For example, in Townsend's case, 75 Eng. Rep. 173, 178-79 (K.B. 1554), the court
stated: "For the office of 12 men is no other than to enquire of matters of fact, and not to
adjudge what the law is, for that is the office of the Court, and not of the jury . .. ."
There was, however, some dissension concerning this principle among English jurists.
See Bushel's Case, 84 Eng. Rep. 1123, 1124-25 (C.P. 1670).' See generally 1 HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 27, at 317-19 (7th ed. 1956) (jury's role in determining the law was evident as
early as the fourteenth century); THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE
COMMON LAW 185 (1898) (court always had a role in deciding questions of fact); Scott, Trial
by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HAuv. L. REV. 669, 675-83 (1918) (discussing
the history of the jury's province).
The rule underwent a similar struggle to establish its preeminence in colonial America,
where lawyers occasionally were permitted to argue the law to the jury. Farley, Instructions
to Juries-Their Role in the Judicial Process, 42 YALE L.J. 194, 201 (1932). By the time of
the American Revolution, however, the modern division of responsibilities at trial regarding
matters of law and fact was firmly established in criminal cases, and was generally followed
in civil cases as well. Not all judges agreed. In 1794 Chief Justice Jay wrote:
[It is] the good old rule, that on questions of fact, it is the province of the jury,
on questions of law, it is the province of the court, to decide. But it must be
observed, that by the same law, which recognizes this reasonable distribution of
jurisdiction, you have, nevertheless, a right to take upon yourselves to judge of
both, and to determine the law as well as the fact in controversy. On this, and on
every other occasion, however, we have no doubt, you will pay that respect which
is due to the opinion of the court: for as, on the one hand, it is presumed, that
juries are the best judges of facts; it is, on the other hand, presumable, that the
court are the best judges of law. But still, both objects are lawfully, within your
power of decision.
Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794) (footnotes omitted). That the jury only
decides questions of fact is well established. See United States v. Del Toro, 426 F.2d 181,
184 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970); Cameron v. Hauck, 383 F.2d 966, 973 (5th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1039 (1968).
For reasons why the jury should generally decide questions of fact, see Broeder, The
Functions of the Jury-Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. Cm. L. REV. 386, 417-19 (1954).
57. For analogous concerns about the label of "law" or "fact" in a similar context, see
Miller, supra note 14.
58. Law has been defined as a "phras[e] which shall set off in one class the generality
1983]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:451
have serious consequences, as illustrated by the historical treat-
ment of foreign law issues at trial. 9 The treatment of foreign law
questions also demonstrates that labels of law or fact can change.
The similarities between some law and fact issues, moreover, do
not support the radically different consequences that flow from la-
beling an issue as either law or fact. Just as the differences be-
tween fact and opinion are matters of degree and not of kind, the
boundary between law and fact is similarly blurred.10 One com-
mentator has asserted that only lawyers view questions of law and
questions of fact as falling into separate categories." The close re-
lationship between the two is evidenced by the existence of issues
containing both law and fact, called "mixed questions of law and
fact. ' '62 For these reasons, strict adherence to treating questions la-
beled as law different from those labeled as fact misinterprets the
significance of the law-fact distinction. It is not the label affixed to
the testimony that is important, but whether a deviation in use
interferes with the performance of responsibilities by judge or jury.
Significantly, expert legal testimony does not upset the existing
system. When such testimony is offered to the jury, the judge still
decides whether the testimony meets the requirements of admissi-
bility. 3 And under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the judge has
that the State sanctions and will habitually enforce a relation of a specific content." 1 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 22. Fact, on the other hand, has been defined as the occurrence of any
concrete phenomenon or event. Id.; see also Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 72
U. PA. L. REV. 111, 112 (1924).
While the definitions appear distinct, the dividing line escapes obvious demarcation.
The term "fact" encompasses all matters "in the sense that everything in the Cosmos is a
fact or phenomenon." J. WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 1.
Even without such an expansive definition of fact, it is often difficult in practice to
distinguish between issues of law and issues of fact. As one commentator has noted: "Mat-
ters of law grow downward into roots of fact and matters of fact reach upward into matters
of law." J. DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES 55 (1927). Cf. Morris, Law and Fact, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1303 (1942) (" 'Questions of
fact' and 'questions of law' are distinct categories, involving real differences for the lawyer
and the judge. And the difference is one of kind, and not merely one of degree." Id. at
1306.).
59. See supra text accompanying notes 35-40.
60. See McCormick, Some Observations upon the Opinion Rule and Expert Testi-
mony, 23 TEx. L. REV. 109, 111 (1945).
61. J. BEALE, supra note 35, at 118 (1916).
62. Mixed questions, such as whether a person acted reasonably or negligently, require
a determination of whether certain conduct falls within a particular legal category. For a
discussion of the characterization of issues as mixed questions of law and fact, see O.W.
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 122 (1881). Mixed questions, which in effect call for deter-
minations of the boundaries of the law, most often are placed before the fact finder for
resolution.
63. The judge determines admissibility pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 104.
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full authority over the use, scope and form of the testimony
presented." By providing jury instructions to shape the effect of
the testimony, the judge retains further control. Thus, the use of
expert legal testimony does not sacrifice the judge's status as sole
arbiter of the law, or impugn the integrity and authority of the
judicial office.
Furthermore, and perhaps most significantly, the actual im-
pact of the testimony should be minimal because of its limited oc-
currence. In most cases there will be no cause to permit it," nor is
it even likely to be offered. Cost considerations and judicial reluc-
tance to ignore the "law" label affixed to the testimony will un-
doubtedly act as a-natural cap on its use. In addition, judges will
want to avoid the appearance of depending on experts to inform
them about the law. If necessary, rules limiting the use of such
testimony could be promulgated. Accordingly, expert legal testi-
mony should have a minimal impact on the system.
E. Support in the Federal Rules
The purpose and spirit of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which govern the admissibility of evidence at trial, support the
limited use of testimony on the law. The stated purpose of the
Federal Rules of Evidence is "to secure fairness in administration,
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of
growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." 66
This broad purpose encompasses several precepts of the trial pro-
cess-including fairness and efficiency-and may reasonably be
viewed as embracing testimony that furthers these goals.
The specific rule covering expert testimony supports the use of
expert testimony on the law to the jury. Rule 702 states, in perti-
nent part, that a witness may testify as an expert "[i]f scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue . . .
This provision does not set boundaries on the content of the testi-
mony. Instead, it focuses on the utility of the testimony. As stated
in the Advisory Committee Notes: "Whether the situation is a
proper one for the use of expert testimony is to be determined on
64. The judge is responsible for the mode and order of presentation of evidence at trial.
FED. R. EVID. 611.
65. See cases cited supra note 7.
66. FED. R. Ev[D. 102.
67. Id. 702.
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the basis of assisting the trier. . . . When opinions are excluded it
is because they are unhelpful and therefore superfluous and a
waste of time." 68 This approach, geared almost exclusively toward
the usefulness of the testimony, may reasonably be seen as provid-
ing for selective expert testimony on the law.
Regarding testimony to the court, the Rules do not place an
express limitation on the judge. The judge has broad discretion in
determining the methodology to be used to ascertain the applica-
ble domestic law. The Advisory Committee Notes, however, imply
that the data consulted must be "pertinent."69
V. SPECIFIC USES OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE LAW
A. For the Benefit of the Judge
In the context of aiding the judge, courts have permitted ex-
pert testimony on the law in several recent cases. These cases have
presented complex or obscure questions of law.
In one recent case, Ohio v. Collins,70 a federal bankruptcy
court judge in Ohio rejected expert testimony on the state's Medi-
caid law despite the court's inability to find a written statement
concerning the Ohio system for determining Medicaid reimburse-
ment rates. The judge, in refusing to allow the witness to testify,
noted that the testimony would have involved only matters of state
law, which the judge is presumed to know. On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the judge's ruling ordinarily
would have been proper, but that this case presented questions of
law to which answers were not readily available.
The court of appeals was unable to decide the case without a
precise statement of the Ohio regulatory scheme. Ohio had not
published administrative regulations for the period in question.
The case was remanded to permit the expert to fulfill "the overrid-
ing need of the court to ascertain the proper status of Ohio law."71
The circuit court stated:
We believe that when the legal inquiry extends to a complex
scheme such as Medicaid, and when the state regulations are not
readily available in published form, a court should not hesitate
68. Id. advisory committee note.
69. Id. 201 advisory committee note, quoted supra note 30.
70. Ohio v. Collins (In re Madeline Marie Nursing Homes), 694 F.2d 433, 445 (6th Cir.
1982).
71. Id. at 446.
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to seek out all of the practical assistance it can obtain in its
function as ultimate determiner of the law ...
• . . We believe that it was appropriate for the state to
have offered expert testimony and documentary proof as to mat-
ters of Ohio's regulatory scheme which ordinary diligence would
not unearth. It is beneficial for the trier of fact to take the initi-
ative to uncover and familiarize itself with the appropriate legis-
lative and historical facts needed for decision. We remand for
that purpose.7
A federal district court in Florida permitted a legal expert to
testify in the case of Louis v. Nelson.73 The case involved a chal-
lenge by Haitian immigrants to the policies and procedures of the
United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). The
Haitians alleged that the United States government had formu-
lated a detention policy that did not meet the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act requirements and had applied that facially neutral pol-
icy in a discriminatory manner against only Haitians.74 At trial, the
plaintiffs offered the testimony of Professor Charles GordonT5 a
noted authority on immigration law.7 Professor Gordon testified
on the substance and effects of the immigration laws, particularly
on the INS policy toward Haitians.77 The trial court admitted Pro-
fessor Gordon's testimony over the defendant's objection. The pol-
icy of detaining only Haitians was unwritten, and although many
employees of INS testified about implementation of the policy, the
trial judge admitted the testimony of the immigration law expert.
An expert on the law of unfair competition testified in Deere
& Co. v. Farmhand, Inc.78 In Deere, the plaintiff alleged violations
of its trademark and of the common law of unfair competition.
Farmhand counterclaimed that Deere had brought a baseless ac-
tion in an attempt to monopolize the market for farm equipment.
In support of this contention, Farmhand offered the testimony of a
72. Id. at 445-46 (footnotes omitted).
73. 544 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Fla. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, sub nom. Jean v.
Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir.) (opinion withdrawn), reh'g en banc granted, 714 F.2d 96
(1983), rev'd, No. 82-5772 (Feb. 27, 1984).
74. 544 F. Supp. at 984.
75. Professor Gordon was formerly General Counsel of the Imnigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service of the United States. At the time of the testimony, he was a professor at the
Georgetown University Law Center.
76. Professor Gordon is the co-author of C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION
LAW AND PROCEDURE (rev. ed. 1983).
77. Appellees/Cross-Appellants Brief at 13, Jean v. Nelson, No. 82-5772 (11th Cir. Apr.
12, 1983).
78. 560 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Iowa 1982), affd, 721 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1983).
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professor of trademark and patent law, who "testified as an expert
in the field of unfair competition law."'7' The court determined
that the expert's testimony was relevant, and it overruled the
plaintiff's objections. 0
The Deere trial judge noted "that throughout the entire trial
of this action, the parties have disagreed as to the nature of the
alleged wrong. Although both parties agree that this is an action
for unfair competition, they disagree as to the applicability of
trademark law." 81 The legal expert testified on the plaintiff's bur-
den of proof under the trademark law and on whether a prudent
attorney practicing in this area of the law would have brought an
action against Farmhand for the violations alleged.82 The judge
considered the expert testimony in determining that the plaintiff
should not prevail on either the trademark infringement or the un-
fair competition claims.8 The trial judge expressly stated that he
allowed the expert testimony because of his own ability to properly
weigh testimony.84
B. For the Benefit of the Jury
Where legal testimony has been presented to a jury, it has
generally consisted of an opinion on the uncertainty of the law at
the time of the alleged violation, 5 or of an opinion on the reasona-
bleness of the party's interpretation of the law."'
In United States v. Garber87 a woman who received over two
hundred thousand dollars in payments for her rare blood plasma
was convicted of willfully attempting to evade federal income tax
laws.88 An integral part of her defense was that she believed she
79. 560 F. Supp. at 93. The expert was Michael Voorhees, a practicing attorney and a
professor of trademark and patent law. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 94.
82. Id. at 91 n.10; id. at 92 n.12.
83. Id. at 88.
84. Id. at 91 n.10.
85. See United States v. Carter, 607 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1979).
86. See United States v. Herzog, 632 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1980). Expert testimony on the
law was not allowed in this case because it would not shed any light on why the defendant
had filed false tax returns.
87. 607 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1979).
88. Garber's blood plasma contained a very rare antibody that was used in the produc-
tion of a blood-typing serum. Garber donated her antibodies as many as six times per month
in a painful procedure. Garber reported a weekly salary received as part of her donative
activities, but she did not report the payments for the antibody donations. She was indicted
for failing to report the receipts for the antibody donations in the years 1970, 1971 and 1972.
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was not obligated to pay tax on the receipts.89 At the trial, both the
defendant and the prosecution proffered expert testimony concern-
ing the taxability of the defendant's income. The prosecution of-
fered an expert's opinion that defendant's earnings from the sale of
plasma constituted taxable income. The defendant offered an ex-
pert's opinion that the earnings did not fall within the legal defini-
tion of income under section 61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code,
and therefore were not taxable.90 The trial judge heard the testi-
mony of the two experts, but refused to admit the testimony of
either witness into evidence for the jury's consideration, reasoning
that the question of taxability was an issue of law for the court and
not for the jury to decide. The judge did, however, allow the prose-
cution to introduce into evidence the expert testimony of an Inter-
nal Revenue agent that additional taxable income was due but not
reported for the years in question. The defendant objected to the
introduction of this testimony, arguing that the witness based his
testimony on the conclusion that the compensation received was
indeed taxable.' 1
The court rejected the defendant's argument that the testi-
mony of its expert should be permitted before the jury to show
that doubt existed as to whether a tax was due and to demonstrate
the vagueness of the law. The defendant alleged that this testi-
mony was crucial to her case, since admission of the testimony
would have precluded the finding of the requisite intent to violate
the law. The court, while recognizing that the defense expert's the-
ory may have been relevant to the issue of taxability, ruled that,
since the expert had never discussed his opinion of the law with
the defendant, the opinion was not relevant to the factual issue of
the defendant's intent.92
After hearing all the evidence, the trial court held as a matter
of law that the money received by the defendant during the three
years in question was income that was subject to taxation. The
jury found the defendant innocent of the charges for the first two
years, but found her guilty of knowingly misstating her income on
her tax return for the third year.'8
89. 607 F.2d at 99.
90. The defense offered a former revenue agent and certified public accountant who
would have testified that in his opinion the taxability of the payments was novel and
uncertain.
91. 607 F.2d at 95.
92. Id.
93. She was sentenced to eighteen months in prison, all but 60 days of which were
suspended by the court, given a $5,000 fine, and placed on probation for twenty-one months.
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Without resolving the issues of whether the defendant's earn-
ings were taxable, or whether this was purely a question of law for
the court's resolution, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in an en
banc decision reversed the trial court and remanded the case. The
court stated:
We hold that the combined effect of the trial court's eviden-
tiary rulings excluding defendant's proffered expert testimony
and its requested jury charge [that a misunderstanding as to de-
fendant's liability for the tax is a valid defense to the charge of
income tax evasion] prejudicially deprived the defendant of a
valid theory of her defense....
...[B]ecause the district court refused to permit . . . the
expert for the government, and . . . the expert for the defense,
to testify and because it reserved to itself the job of unriddling
the tax law, thus completely obscuring from .the jury the most
important theory of Garber's defense-that she could not have
willfully evaded a tax if there existed a reasonable doubt in the
law that a tax was due-her trial was rendered fundamentally
unfair."
The court stressed that "[iln a case such as this where the ele-
ment of willfulness is critical to the defense, the defendant is enti-
tled to wide latitude in the introduction of evidence tending to
show lack of intent."" The court applied a balancing test in decid-
ing whether to hold that the expert testimony should have been
admitted, weighing the general impropriety of testimony on the
law against the importance of assuring that the defendant has a
full and fair opportunity to defend against the charges.
Judges Ainsworth and Tjoflat both filed dissenting opinions in
Garber, raising what are perhaps the two most pressing objections
to the use of expert testimony on the state of the law-that it in-
vades the province of the judge and that it fails to meet the admis-
sibility requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
It is the trial judge who must make rulings on the law involved
in the case, and boilerplate jury instructions have since time im-
memorial stated that the jury takes the law only from the court.
Now a new rule is attempted by the majority which in effect
states that the jury must take its instructions on the law from
Id.
94. Id. at 97.
95. Id. at 99.
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expert witnesses as well as the trial judge. 6
Judge Ainsworth further stated that, since "[the purpose of expert
testimony is to 'assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue,' ",97 and "since there was no show-
ing that [the defendant] had consulted the expert or relied on his
view, or views of any other accountant or lawyer, the testimony
was unrelated to a determination of defendant's intent or willfull-
ness," 98 and was properly excluded from the jury.
Judge Tjoflat, in his dissent, argued that the expert testimony
was not relevant to the defendant's intent, and thus failed to meet
the admissibility requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 402.
Furthermore, he believed that the probative value of the testimony
failed to outweigh the dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues and the possibility of misleading the jury, so that the testi-
mony was also inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
Judge Tjoflat asserted that the defendant's argument that the
law was so uncertain that she could not be guilty of willful evasion
was in effect a vagueness challenge against the statute, and conse-
quently was an issue of law for the court. The vagueness challenge
is premised on the proposition that "when the law is vague or high-
ly debatable, a defendant-actually or imputedly-lacks the requi-
site intent to violate it."99 "Due process requires that the language
of a criminal statute convey 'sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and
practices.' 100 Judge Tjoflat concluded that the law was indeed
vague in its proscription of defendant's activities. Since the impact
of the vagueness of the law on the defendant's intent is an issue of
law for the court's determination, Judge Tjoflat believed that the
appellate court should have dismissed the charges instead of re-
manding for a new trial.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the appropri-
ateness of expert legal testimony in United States v. Clardy.10'
The defendant had been convicted of assisting taxpayers in the
preparation of fraudulent tax returns. The court of appeals held
that the trial court properly admitted into evidence the expert tes-
96. Id. at 105 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 106 (quoting in part FED. R. EvID. 702).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 111 (quoting United States v. Critzer, 498 F.2d 1160, 1162 (4th Cir. 1974)
(Tjoflat, J., dissenting)).
100. Id. at 110 (quoting Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1951)).
101. 612 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1980).
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timony of an Internal Revenue Service agent that the defendant's
interest expenses were not legally deductible. Citing Garber, the
court stated that "this type of testimony is relevant to the issue of
willfulness where the theory of the defense is that there is a good
faith dispute as to the interpretation of the tax laws."' 2
In contrast to the above cases allowing expert testimony on
the uncertainty of a law, there are instances in which a party may
seek to introduce testimony on the certainty of a law. Such testi-
mony was allowed in Laverne v. Corning.103 In Laverne, property
owners brought a civil rights action against various officials of the
Village of Laurel Hollow for alleged unlawful inspections of plain-
tiffs' property. The inspections had been made under the authority
of a village ordinance that subsequently was declared unconstitu-
tional. The defendants claimed that they inspected the property in
good faith pursuant to the ordinance. If true, this good faith would
be a complete defense to the civil rights action. At the trial, the
defendants were permitted to call an expert who testified that at
the time of the inspection "only a clairvoyant could have realized
that the defendants' inspections would some day be declared" un-
constitutional.'0 4 Based upon the jury's finding of good faith, the
court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint.
VI. BRIEF ANALYSIS
The opinions that have been discussed appropriately reflect
less concern for legal testimony to a judge than to a jury. This dis-
parity is probably attributable to confidence in the judge's ability
to assess the testimony on its merits and not to be unduly swayed
by an individual's expertise. The willingness of courts to permit
expert testimony for the benefit of the judge may also indicate a
recognition that the presumption of judicial expertise in all areas
of the law is not always realistic. Whether the purpose of the testi-
mony is fairness to the parties,105 or to add to the judge's knowl-
edge, 1' 6 expert testimony on the law has received some support.
Deere is an excellent example of the appropriate use of expert
legal testimony. The issue, whether the defendant had infringed
102. Id. at 1153.
103. 376 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
104. Id. at 838.
105. E.g., Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Iowa 1982), affd, 721
F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1983); see supra text accompanying notes 78-84.
106. E.g., Ohio v. Collins (In re Madeline Marie Nursing Homes), 694 F.2d 433 (6th
Cir. 1982); see supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
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the plaintiff's functional trademark, was complex. The parties' fail-
ure to agree on the proper cause of action for remedying the al-
leged wrong rendered the briefs, memoranda of law and the oral
arguments .of little help to the court. The expert legal testimony in
Deere met the criteria of efficiency and fairness.
Expert testimony to a jury presents additional problems,
which are both systemic and evidentiary. The testimony may en-
croach on the province of the judge and may be irrelevant or preju-
dicial. The Garber case illustrates these problems. Except for the
fact that it was a criminal prosecution, Garber was a weak case for
expert legal testimony.1 07 There was no evidence that the defen-
dant had relied on or consulted the applicable law prior to violat-
ing it. Although the defense theory may have been potentially
valid, the evidence did not present a factual basis for the proffered
testimony. Therefore, the lack of relevance of the testimony and
the likelihood of undue prejudice should probably have dictated
exclusion of the evidence. In other circumstances, however, such as
in Laverne v. Corning,108 or where reliance on the law is shown, a
reasonable argument can be made for the propriety -of the
testimony.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although it is infrequently employed at trial and generally
held in disfavor, expert testimony on domestic law is appropriately
offered in limited situations to either a judge or a jury. It may as-
sist the judge in determining obscure or complex questions of law.
It may assist the jury in determining whether an individual in-
tended to violate a law or whether he did so in good faith. In these
situations, the systemic and evidentiary objections to allowing the
testimony are outweighed by considerations of fairness and effi-
ciency. In the final analysis, the decision to use such testimony
remains firmly in the hands of the judiciary. Until or unless rules
concerning legal testimony are formulated, courts should focus on
the usefulness of the testimony in deciding whether to permit legal
experts to testify.
107. 607 F.2d 92, 105 (5th Cir. 1979) (dissenting opinions).
108. 376 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); see supra text accompanying notes 103-04.
